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Abstract The current crisis between the EU and Russia is in-
fluenced by much more serious factors than political tensions
over Ukraine or the US political agenda. We suppose that to
some extent it has represented a consequence of the crisis of
national identity in Russia during the post-Soviet period. And
the ongoing crisis clearly reflects that unclear social, political
and national identities allow some stakeholders to substitute an
objective stimulus for sustainable cooperation with cultural and
economic partners that have been historically close, i.e., Russia
and European countries, by negative propaganda. The current
perception of Europe and Europeans, which is widely shared
by the majority of the Russian population, has switched from a
thousand years of joint history, development and cultural enrich-
ment to ‘irreconcilable divergences’. This dramatic process de-
velops both in the EU and Russia nowadays but in this paper we
focus on the challenge to Russian identity, its roots and modern
aspects. The analysis we provide within this paper demonstrates
some fundamental preconditions of the political crisis between
the EU and Russia that started in 2014, related to identity chal-
lenge rather than to international relations per se or value conflict.
The concluding part of this paper is dedicated to a search for new
approaches to identity policy that might be implemented in Rus-
sia and would positively influence a political dialogue between
Europe and Russia by making it more predictable.
Keywords National identity . Post-Soviet identity .
Europe-Russia relations . Individualism/collectivism dilemma
Introduction
The current crisis of European-Russian political relations,
strongly supported by hysteria in the media of both sides,
has mostly privatized the discourse between Europe and Rus-
sia [9]. Moreover, this crisis has almost blocked a perception
of Russia as a unique but European country and Russian-
European history as a joint history of millions of people, not
only of states – both in Moscow and in Brussels. Meanwhile,
passing from a level of political tensions to cultural and iden-
tity levels it would be hard to cross more than one thousand
years of joint history, development and mutual cultural
enrichment.
Developing the premise of I. Prizel that the foreign policy
of any country is significantly influenced by a society’s evolv-
ing notions of itself [15], we suppose that in addition to high-
level politics, a crucial factor of the European-Russian crisis is
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the problem of Russian identity search for itself. Large-scale
disputes of European and national identities are also quite
sharp but it has to be the objective of another research [6].
As for Russia, since the 1990s we have observed a situation
where any identities in Russia (national, professional, social)
have become weak without precedent. Then in the 2000s the
majority of Russians became uninterested in politics, concen-
trated on their own micro-worlds and became inactive in pub-
lic space. When the crisis between Russia and theWest started
in 2014 those people became only objects of media campaigns
and their own stereotypes from the dramatic 1990s.
The fundamental assumption of our research is that weak
national identity makes it susceptible to political propaganda
and turns identity into an instrument of foreign policy instead
of being its key driver and determinant. Conclusively, we
assume that a current political crisis with Europe to some
extent is a direct consequence of weak identities inside Russia
during the post-Soviet period.
The term identity has to be defined. It has been used very
broadly and has become vague as we can see in the critique of
the term, for instance in Brubaker and Cooper [1]. The Rus-
sian academic tradition often replaces identity with the word
self-consciousness [18], but those two concepts are not syno-
nyms. Identity implies a sense of belonging to a certain group,
a unity with its members. National identity in this case means
the sense of belonging to a certain state or nation, which is
shared with a group of people regardless of their country of
citizenship [13]. Regarding the debate on identity in Russia
the term Bnegative identity^ is quite often used. Negative iden-
tity means a lack of positive values and need to build national
consolidation based on an external threat according to Gudkov
[5]. For the purpose of this paper, identity implies a wide range
of values and personal characteristics that lead people to as-
sociate themselves with a particular nation or nation-state.
Speaking of the contribution of Asia and Europe in the
Russian national identity, the paper assumes as given that we
are carriers of an original culture, which nonetheless is
European in nature. It is a culture based on an Eastern Euro-
pean language and art that is an outgrowth of three main
traditions: Antiquity, Byzantium and Western Europe. At the
same time, this country has a political and social culture that is
unique, being neither European nor Asian, and is informed by
its special history and geography.
Historical identifications
Russia’s geographic position and special features of its devel-
opment created a favourable ground for an active conflict
between Westernizing and Slavophil ideologies. The issue of
the Russian idea and historic path has been raised by
statesmen and thinkers since the 12th century. (See, for in-
stance, Instructions for Children by Vladimir Monomakh).
Over the past several centuries, a number of great minds have
tried to find an answer to fundamental questions of Russia’s
development. They included A. S. Khomyakov (BOf the Old
and the New^), R. A. Fadeev (BWhat Are We to Be: Russian
Society in the Present and the Future^), P. Ya. Chaadaev
(BPhilosophical Letters^), V. S. Solovyev (BL’idée russe^), N.
A. Berdyaev (BRussia’s Fate^), A. M. Maslennikov (BThe Ide-
ology of The Imperial Power in Russia^), L. P. Karsavin (BEast,
West and the Russian Idea^), Serafim (Sobolev) (BRussian
Ideology^) and, finally, the last Russian genius, A. I. Solzheni-
tsyn (BHow Are We to Improve Russia), among others. For a
review of thinkers seeking an answer to what the Russian idea
should be like see an anthology by Yakunin [20].
As an heir to Byzantium with its special spirituality Russia
has been viewed within an ecclesiastical concept. The eccle-
siastical idea assumes a communal spirituality and, conse-
quently, the notion of human brotherhood, which in the case
of Russia entails communal brotherhood. This Byzantine
Christian tradition has been seen as anti-Western, even though
at the time when Russia adopted Christianity Byzantium was
the most advanced area of Christian Europe. The proponents
of the ecclesiastical vision saw the West as the main, uncom-
promising foe, both ideologically and politically. The ecclesi-
astical vision entails a return to the concept of BOrthodoxy,
Autocracy and Nationality^ (or, in some other form,
BSpirituality, Statehood and Ecclesiastic Idea^) as a basic
building block of national identity.1 Since this strategy and
means of achieving it points to the past and to a lack of a stable
connection to reality, the use of the ecclesiastic vision in lay-
ing ideological foundations for the country’s development
may prove difficult.
Supporters of the Russian Doctrine believe that the BGlobal
Russian Project^ should be advanced on the basis of dynamic
conservatism. They envision room for reforming the existing
state and society, but only in order to achieve the main goal: to
preserve traditions.2
Keeping in mind a certain utopian quality entailed in the
creation of a proto-state, and the on-going shift in society
away from the idea of the Russian Civilization in the way
the concept’s authors see it, it does not seem that it will be
able to play a significant role in developing the domestic and
foreign policy of the country.
Adherents to the Neo-Imperial or Neo-Soviet concept see
the resurrection of the old Empire or the building of a new one
as the main goal of Russia’s existence. This school, along with
more moderate calls to take account of the Bunconscious
Sovietism^ that survives in a large portion of the population,
includes radical appeals to create an Bunconventional Empire,
a world of worlds, or the USSR-II^ [7].
1 Russian Doctrine (Sergy’s Project) is presented at http://www.
velikoross.ru/doktrina/ Accessed on March 5, 2015
2 Ibid
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The Nationalist and Ultra-Nationalist school sees the key
to success in recreating the Empire around the Russian nation.
The Neo-Imperial movement wants the Great Empire to be
restored mainly by force and wants the nation to be mobilized
against its enemies who threaten it from all sides. In other
words, they want to embark on the same path that a quarter
of a century ago doomed the USSR. This school of thought is
unrealistic, but it should not be dismissed out of hand. It is
backed by a powerful, centuries-old idea, which was the core
of the nation and the state, i.e., defence against the outside
threat. Finally, at a time when other sources of strength of
the nation, such as spiritual and technological ones, are stag-
nating and even decaying, reliance on military power may
have an appeal to many people.
The Liberal Westernizing Movement, whose supporters
want Russia to adopt the democratic model of development
primarily oriented toward European nations, presents a sharp
contrast to the above-mentioned concepts. The crises affecting
Western nations have greatly reduced the appeal of this
school. Moreover, one of the weaknesses of the Liberal West-
ernizing School is that they embrace an ideal without taking
account of the situation on the ground, the state of society and
the people, who have a very limited experience of democratic
development and have been traumatized by 20th century
history.
The Eurasian concept rejects both Sovietism and liberal
Westernization as suitable for Russia, stressing instead that the
country is an Bindependent and self-contained civilization^.3
The range of ideological currents whose goal is to define
Russia’s path and identity is not limited to the above-
mentioned concepts, but they give a clear sense of the diffi-
culty of making the national choice. The range of choices
Russia can make in its attempt to define itself is extremely
broad, including [11]:
& integration into the European civilization or preservation
of the special Russian civilization;
& empire or nation-state;
& relative isolation or full openness;
& liberalism or paternalism;
& individualism or collectivism;
& mobilization or modernization;
& Political or Imperial nation.
The two decades that have passed since the collapse of the
Soviet Union have precluded a revival of the Soviet identity.
The Russian identity has started to be recreated in the mass
consciousness but it has not become strong enough and has
not been reflected in a tangible strategy of the country’s de-
velopment. Russia finds itself in a difficult position. After
1917, the Soviet identity was systematically imposed while
the pre-Soviet one was deliberately destroyed. The last rem-
nants of the Soviet identity are dying out, whereas the pre-
Soviet identity has not been restored. Nor can it ever be fully
restored.
Modern identity challenge
Russian society is fractured and its ideological, religious and
ethnic fault lines continue to multiply. The elites have been
active participants in this fracturing. The state has a negative
image that is only becoming worse: we have endemic corrup-
tion, disrespect for human rights and widespread social vul-
nerability in place of a social safety net.
Over the past 20 years, the values of our citizens have
changed dramatically, and not for the better. Soviet commu-
nism destroyed the Christian and universal religious morality.
The Soviet morality and ideology were destroyed in the
1990s. No new morality and ideology, which could have been
a foundation for building a competitive new Russia, has
emerged. This is why traditional religions in Russia are so
important in order to introduce moral norms in society. At-
tempts by churches to compensate the numerous social fail-
ings in one fell swoop have had the opposite effect: interest for
religion has been waning after spiking in the early 2000s.
Among the values of today’s Russians material well-being
and consumption take first place - 55 % in 2006 compared to
31% in 1986. Hereinafter in this section data on Russian polls
are cited from Salmina [17]. Decades of shortages and then
conspicuous consumption by the elites, as well as the promo-
tion of upscale consumption by the mass media. Given the
highly unequal income distribution, this leads to an even
greater fragmentation of society and growth of social tensions.
An entire non-patriotic generation has been raised, who
only marginally associate themselves with their country. They
do not know its history and are not prepared to build their
future here. The sense of community shared with other citi-
zens of the country has been lost. The proportion of those who
want to be useful to society has declined fourfold in the period
of 1986–2006 from 26 to 6 %.
Even the importance of family and children has declined.
While in 1986,4 before the onset of major social and economic
reforms, family and marriage were in first place among the
values of the Russian people, at 60 %, followed by children at
55 %, today the importance of family and children has de-
clined, even though it remains high, at 53 and 45 %,
respectively.
3 See more about Eurasia Political Party at http://eurasia.com.ru/
basicprin.html. Accessed on March 5, 2015
4 Results from 1986 are from a poll conducted by the Institute of Sociol-
ogy of the Russian Academy of Sciences under the direction of Prof.
Levykin (a sample of 4,400 participants). Results from 2006 are from a
poll by TsESSI (a sample of 1,200), conducted using the same
methodology.
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The attitude towards work has changed as well. In the So-
viet era work was viewed as a source of respect, social status
and self-realization; today, the majority sees work as a source
of material well-being. On the other hand, today, unlike the
Soviet era, it actually can provide it. Meanwhile, the impor-
tance of an Binteresting job^ declined from 41 to 29 %, while
Brespect of others^ went from 27 to 17 %. In effect, we have
seen abstract values being replaced by material ones [4].
The scale that measures determinants of personal success
has also changed noticeably. The importance of work has
declined, from 74 to 52 %, while the share of Russians who
believe that success depends on luck has increased, from 7 %
in 1986 to 30 % in 2006.56 This reflects important aspects of
today’s life, such as a lack of predictability and clannish close-
ness of the elites.
Professionals and the educated portion of the elite have lost
hope to transform the government quickly and have seen the
full depth of corruption, nepotism and lack of professionalism
that prevails there. They have started to criticize not only the
ruling class but society as a whole. They insist - correctly at
times - that Russians are antisocial and fragmented, and in-
stead of acting as citizens they act as pathologically profit-
maximizing individualists. But they ignore factors that created
this: the highly controversial Soviet period, then the collapse
of the state and the turmoil and privations of the 1990s, and
then a period of tranquillity, which has now been transformed
into apathy.
Nevertheless, people have not lost their ability to assess the
situation objectively, which is evidenced by the obscenely low
level of trust for all state entities and structures. The only
exception is the President, whose absolute trust has fluctuated
in the 60–70 % range in recent years, and conservative insti-
tutions, such as the Church and the Military, who are trusted
by around four out of every ten Russians [4, 16].
During the difficult 1990s, people developed another im-
portant quality, self-reliance. Just as they had donemany times
in their history, the Russian people proved their extraordinary
ability to survive. But people are tired of constantly struggling
to survive all by themselves. The accumulated exhaustion has
logically translated into the desire to have a high level of social
protection, stoking the age-long affinity for paternalism.
People are able to assess the true extent of the natural
wealth of the country while also gauging the extent of social
inequality, giving rise to an emotional desire for more social
protection with an ironclad logic: income from natural re-
sources should be divided more equitably.
It should be noted that material well-being (along with
good health, which is valued by 33%) is followed on the scale
of social values by the dream of living in a more just and
rationally structured society (33 %). This is effectively a de-
mand for equal opportunity to realize one’s talents and equal-
ity before the law.
Let us stress it one more time: people in Russia have not
demanded direct financial support. Some outrageously
underfunded professions sometimes make this demand. But
ordinary people have deserved Russia’s wealth to be
channelled to equalize opportunities by not lowering the plank
but by raising it; i.e., they do not want the oligarchs’ kids to be
sent to a village school, but to raise the level of education
obtained at village schools to that of rich urban ones. Above
all, such demands concern health care and education, i.e., the
physical and mental well-being of the nation.
Thus, despite objective problems and various dangers, we
should not yet lose hope with regard to Russian society. The
difficult situation as far as its values and norms is concerned at
the everyday, social and state levels has nothing to do with the
question of national identity. It merely describes the current
state of affairs in Russia.
Nation state or empire
Academic attempts to separate the issue of identity and nation
into two groups, civic and ethnic, proved to be a failure in
Russia. An ethnic division is a senseless and dangerous Uto-
pia. An attempt to formulate a national identity through eth-
nicity and religion goes against the grain of the history of the
Russian civilization. It may temporarily unite a portion of the
population but it would undermine the very foundations of
Russian society and the state. I.A. Bunin7 wrote: B…the peo-
ple are like lumber. It can be fashioned into an icon or a stick,
depending on who works this piece of lumber, St. Sergius of
Radonezh or Yemelian Pugachev^ [2]. Any time society
yields to chauvinism, be it Russian nationalism or the nation-
alism of smaller groups, it is a path leading to suicide.
It is too early, to say the least, to discuss the emergence of a
civic nation in a country that twice in the past 100 years
effected a revolutionary change of its political system and
economic model and failed to build a law-based state. In Rus-
sia, the historically dominant culture has been the Russian
culture. Russia has its minorities and they will always be there,
but the trauma of the 20th century, with its criminal policy
with regard to other ethnic groups (it would suffice to mention
persecution and exile of entire nations based on their blood-
lines and the division of the country into 15 national republics,
5 Today’s Russians value much less than their Soviet counterparts such
qualities as honesty and decency (63 % in 1986 vs. 41 % in 2006),
compassion and goodness (57 % vs. 27 %), mutual understanding and
mutual assistance (53 % vs. 27 %), responsibility (46 % vs. 32 %), prin-
cipled positions (22 % vs. 14 %) and unselfishness (20 % vs. 10 %).
6 Positive changes have been in the higher value ascribed to individual-
istic leadership qualities, such as determination in achieving goals (27 %
vs. 37%), abilities and talents (15% vs. 32 %), initiative (21% vs. 25%),
ability to compromise, flexibility (4 % vs. 20 %) and leadership (9 % vs.
16 %). 7 Outstanding Russian writer, winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature
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which then underpinned their demand for independence),
must not be carried over into the 21st century. The Russian
national identity must be built based on the principle of a
common cultural space with bright ethnic additions that serve
to enrich the main culture. The most obvious example of this
is the coexistence of sauerkraut, salted herring, shish kebab
and pilaf on our holiday tables.
At the moment there is no option besides admitting that
Russia is neither a nation state nor an empire. In the long
run, Russia could be some hybrid form of a civic and
culture-based nation. The connections which lie in the cultural
space are codified in the great Russian literature, music, visual
arts, architecture and cinema, the latter being the strongest
melting pot for all who see themselves as connected to the
Russian Federation. The original Russian culture emerged as
a result of many centuries of intertwining great cultures, first
the Antiquity and Byzantium, as a result of an invasion – the
Tatar-Mongol culture and, finally, the brilliant Western Euro-
pean culture of the modern age.
In the course of this complex symbiosis, the internationally
recognized Russian culture was formed in the 19th century,
taking its rightful place in the world and continuing into the
20th century. As an amalgam of different elements can under-
go chemical reactions and acquire new and improved qualities
compared to the original components, so the Russian culture
was able not only to combine disparate tradition but also to
enrich them and to raise its own structure based on that foun-
dation. The result has been the emergence of the original Rus-
sian nation and the Russian identity, which existed in the Rus-
sian Empire. Under massive pressure, it was partially replaced
by the Soviet identity that endured for less than 100 years.
Naturally, our unique culture has been lost, but the connection
to it has been weakened. It must be strengthened again and
bolstered by new works. When it is restored, it will in itself
become the source of inspiration and enthusiasm and provide
moral support for the people, society and the state.
Naturally, the Russian identity must be discussed in mod-
ern terms, understanding not only what the Russian culture
and history have to offer, but also what a modern world de-
mand is. Most heritage projects, either it is the heritage of the
Byzantine Empire or the Soviet Union, reek of mothballs.
They are invariably backward looking and have no power to
rally the people for long time.
The key question that needs to be answered before
discussing identity is the question of its carrier. Are we talking
about the country (Russia’s path) or its citizens (and what
makes one a Russian in the first place)? Traditionally the Rus-
sian political thought defined the state as the main subject of
national identity and has been concentrated on ‘historic
choice’. But in reality, the subject of national identity is not
a state but its citizen. And a citizenship implies rights and
responsibilities. Nowadays attitudes of Russians to both of
them are quite foggy.
From population to society
For most Russians economic and social rights definitely pre-
vail over the political ones. Those who give enough credit to
political rights mostly favour the so-called ‘passive rights’,
i.e., freedom of speech and conscience. Here the focus is on
the freedom from direct responsibility for the realization of the
right rather than on the freedom of participation. Therefore,
the majority perceives political freedom as ‘freedom from po-
litical participation rather than freedom of political
participation’ [12].
At the beginning it should be stated that most Russians are
not interested in politics. This is especially true of the youth. In
2008 almost two thirds of the population had ‘no idea what-
soever what political regime there is in the country and what
regime would be desirable’ [4]. In accordance with 2010 es-
timates, 40 % of the population are absolutely uninterested in
politics or they find it difficult to formulate their preferences
[19]. The mistrust in the main branches and institutions of
power (the President being the only exception) is based on
the objective evaluation of their performance and thus does
not inspire any interest in politics either. For many people
formally having political preferences the ‘label’ without any
explanation of its implications limits them.
Speaking about the attitudes to freedom and democracy, it
would be of interest to point out a curious contradiction. The
notion of human rights (personal freedoms) ranks higher than
‘collective freedom’, i.e., democracy [16]. At the same time,
the majority of Russians (54 %) are convinced that collectiv-
ism, the notion of community and tough government regula-
tion are more typical of Russians and better suit the national
culture than Western-type individualism and liberalism [8]. It
is likely that here we once again face the clash of notions and
true preferences: the direct question of what is more valuable
to you elicits one answer, while the answer to the question on
society in general contains generally accepted attitudes rather
than personal opinions.
Disappointment and apathy are the words that describe the
majority’s attitude to politics in general and to the existing
power institutions’ performance in particular. This civil amor-
phousness cannot be exclusively attributed to the crisis of
today’s political system devoid of any comprehensible value
paradigm.
No matter how sad it may sound, so far Russians have
proved to be asocial. For the vast majority the circle of con-
tacts, interconnectedness and personal responsibility is limited
by the family and closest friends, mostly childhood ones. Only
50 % believe they can anyhow influence the situation even at
work [4]. The maximum involvement in social institutions
(meagre 2 %) falls on the participation in school parents’ as-
sociations, all other forms of association (sports societies, re-
ligious communities, associations of fellow-countrymen, etc.)
account for 0.5–1.9 %, while 90 % of the population do not
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belong to any NGO or movement [4]. Besides, Russians do
not tend to visit public spaces [4, 10]: on the one hand, this is
due to the low level of income that prevents people from
spending on leisure; on the other hand, this is due to the lim-
ited circle of contacts and reluctance to go beyond it. Howev-
er, this state of things is an obvious outcome of the social and
economic ‘trauma’ of the 1990s: in the Soviet era in the con-
ditions of closed society with limited leisure infrastructure
cinemas performed a significant compensatory function.
Young people went to the cinema almost weekly and on av-
erage, taking into account new born and senile people, a So-
viet person went to the cinema 18–20 times a year [3]. Con-
currently there was a reaction to the induced involvement in
public life over 70 years of the Soviet era (subbotnik,8 partic-
ipation in demonstrations, public committees, etc.). This kind
of asocial tradition is now being translated by senior genera-
tions to their children.
The combination of the abovementioned features leads to
the fact that Russians tend to be massively inactive in public
spaces, they lack environment for discussing their own polit-
ical requirements and eventually do not articulate any political
demand.
There is no community – there is an illusion from Internet
forums. In this paper we focus on the most promising option
to strengthen an identity and thus – to partially extract bilateral
and multilateral relations from quickly evolving political con-
juncture keeping some cultural and identity foundation for an
on-going dialogue.
If we move a bit above a Leviathan concept of a state we
must admit that it is very important role is to create a sphere
for human interaction where smaller identities can be formed
and to nudge people toward each other in order to make sure
those threads start connecting them. It should send signals and
provide symbols to society, which would help people come
together. It should also seek and develop points where this
coming together can occur, above all, in the Russian language
and culture. It must refrain completely from sending signals
and imposing symbols which would divide various social,
ethnic and religious groups.
The role of society and its intellectual elites is to use this
sphere and not turn away from it. They should formulate ideas
which arise in the course of civic discussion, the best ones of
which the state should then implement.
Russian society is deeply divided. Individuals are rooted in
their families, friends and the home and nothing and no one
else matters. There are very few strong identities. The reli-
gious and ethnic identity is static and strictly defined. These
identities may be useful as engines of creative activity, but
their role will always be limited. At the same time, profession-
al, civic and even hobby-based identities remain very vague.
A project that could take the country out of its depression
could be to create as many active identities as possible. This
can be achieved if we build platforms for active people to
engage in interactions. The most obvious examples of such
platforms are local self-government and independent organi-
zations of citizens, or non-government organizations.
Professional identities can be revived by developing pro-
fessional associations whose purpose is to support profession-
al debates (but not trade unions which in their current form
function exclusively as means of distributing social goods).
Such platforms should be completely unbureaucratized and
must function without the intermediation of any officials, ex-
cept as individuals.
But the main task remains to promote respect for work. We
must pay special attention to occupations that are crucially
important for today’s Russia, i.e., teachers and medics. Those
two professional fields were severely damaged in the 1990s,
even though they are very strongly united by professional
ethics, share common values and speak the same language
in every corner of the country.
The restoration of university student associations is an im-
portant task as well, not as social groups but of students as
cultural actors. We must revive the nearly forgotten students’
traditions. Young people are the engine of the country’s de-
velopment. They should be brought together into a single
creative force, which will have a great potential, one that has
not been engaged today.
Nor should we neglect the powerful and system-building
role of public schools in socializing the population. It remains
the only remaining state institution which all Russians attend.
Both students and parents are socialized, either voluntarily or
forcibly. Parents-teachers committees are today the area where
most Russian are socially active, since around 2 % of citizens
participate in such committees [4]. Rural schools play a par-
ticularly important role. They are often not just a place where
kids get their education but the main cultural centre bringing
together all generations.
First steps have already been made in developing the
schools’ potential for socialization. A recently adopted set of
federal educational standards (which in effect reflect society’s
demands on the school system) stress that every student must
undertake social projects. All we need is to engage this
component.
The society has to develop platforms for leisure activities,
setting up clubs for people with such hobbies as music, cine-
ma, local history, the environment, etc. and developing ama-
teur athletics – all those activities are not only about particular
interest – they are about membership, co-participation – being
a part of a group, not of a crowd. It is of great importance to
develop urban spaces and to transform cities, which are home
for a growing proportion of Russians, into a friendly environ-
ment promoting human socialization rather than pushing peo-
ple away and toward their television screens and computers.8 Large-scale compulsory area cleanings on Saturdays
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The proposed ideas aim to revive creative collectivism and,
especially, solidarity which has always been a special strength
of the Russian people and which has all but disappeared. Ex-
cept now it will be a new kind of collectivism, different from
the one that was cultivated in the Soviet Union. That one was
artificial and its result was failure. It will not be an imposed
collectivism in which the weak keep the strong back. It will be
a voluntary and mutually beneficial collectivism, which will
allow the strong to join their efforts and thus become, with
active support from the state, even stronger, pulling up the
weak along the way. It will be a collectivism which will arise
due to the need for self-realization of the individual - who is
always motivated, be the desire to serve - and therefore repre-
sents the highest form of individualism.
Education
The area where Russians are still the most proactive and in-
volved is the education system. The forms of this participation
vary and are not always perfect but as we mentioned above at
least school is a unique institution in Russia which the whole
population passes through and even two times – as a pupil and
as a parent of a pupil.
Meanwhile all participants of the educational system are in
need of retraining, while reforming the system, as a whole
should be a national priority. Above all, it is because there is
a fundamentally new demand on education, which is different
from the one that existed in the Soviet Union – and which did
not, in reality, exist at all in the 1990s. There is a need for
schools to develop an individual and for universities to form a
professional. The most important skill in today’s world is the
ability to learn. It is the only skill that can provide decent
living over the course of a lifetime.
Russia has lost the competition to Asian countries in indus-
trial labour, while competition with developed countries in
creative spheres and in the service sector is intensifying. There
is no room for a lack of professionalism and low productivity.
The new technology-based system leaves us no alternative but
to put the highest value on the creative, educated individual as
far as society and the state are concerned.
But the educational systemmust not be regarded as solely a
production line for a competitive labour force. The teaching
profession remains the main guardian of national values. It is
in school that a child is first exposed to the Russian literature
and the Russian and world history. Primary school lays the
foundations for the main values and forms the character, too.
All ratings show that our kids finish primary school at the top
compared to the rest of the world. But this enormous potential
is negated by the failure of the middle school and the rest is
either sustained or wasted at high school and in secondary
education.
Improvements in the educational system are a long and
multi-directional process. Its main principles include region-
alization of public spending for education, improved training
both for teachers and administrators, university reform aimed
at making them more competitive, etc. [14].
This is the briefest possible list, and each of the above-
mentioned points will only be able to meet the demand of
the educational process when it is developed further and ex-
panded, and supported by substantial investments. And we
must never forget that education is the main source of national
inspiration.
Conclusions
Our analysis allows us to reveal serious problems with identity
(on different levels from national to professional) inside Rus-
sia and it is getting obvious that those constraints have influ-
enced both Russian internal and foreign policy. Moreover,
several gaps in national identity space and the current devel-
opment of negative identity form an additional obstacle to
solving the Russia-EU crisis.
The most promising options to overcome this heritage are
the socialization of people and education. Development of
those tracks will contribute to a positive reset of the
European-Russian dialogue even without particular EU or
Russian efforts – because it will allow people and communi-
ties both in the EU and Russia to turn to objective and mutual
interests, to enrich each other in research, culture, creativity,
business. Finally it will make these mutual relations more
predictable. Both in Europe and in Russia exist a clear under-
standing that a successful promotion of education and a feel-
ing of co-participation are key factors that determine interna-
tional competitiveness in the 21st century. So even despite
strong political controversies, these objective factors will give
a common ground for Russia and Europe. Otherwise the crisis
both for Russia and Europe will be extremely tough.
As far as interconnections between Europe and Russia are
much stronger than gas and food deliveries (which is mostly a
tabooed topic for last year), a turn to respectful historic and
cultural heritage, a pass from political and interstate level of a
dialogue to a personal and community ones will provide a
necessary playground for a real dialogue of the 21st century.
This dialogue admits mutual respect, a right for mistakes in
the past and in the present and opportunities to correct them –
i.e., a historic model of relations that have existed for hundreds
of years on the European continent.
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